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Abstract
The scientific rationality used by experts towards risk evaluation is expressed as the product
of its likelihood of occurrence with its consequences or impacts (ENISA, 2006a). This
directly opposes the subjective nature of risk perception, often appearing as inconsistent if not
completely irrational (Byrne, 2003).
Risk perception theories are a pathway to explain the subjective nature of risk and a deeper
insight into the human's cognitive system. Those theories may help to explain why people
see, act and plan for risks in the way that they do, the weaknesses that exist in the human
decision mechanisms and their impact on risk perceptions and decisions.
By questioning the existence of risk perception in the information security field of study, this
research acknowledges those risk perception theories and provides a measure of their
influence when rating information security risks.
The research measures the existence of risk perception issues by asking a participating sample
of people to rate the likelihood of ten information security risks that carried previously
measured statistics. In order to archive this, an online survey was designed to capture riskrating information from an informed sample as well as a measure of their self-assessed
information security knowledge.
By measuring the gaps between the participants' answers and the known occurrences of those
risks, the research highlighted a number of disparities revealing the existence of risk
perception divergence. A statistical analysis of the results was performed with the intent of
highlighting gaps in the perception of the given risks. This analysis also allowed the research
to narrow down the scope of risks that may or may not have been perceived with higher or
lower gaps than other risks. Further analysis specifically identified the risks affected by those
gaps, their statistical significance, strength and direction. The areas displaying the highest
perception gaps resided with risks that were generally rare, new and unfamiliar or were being
publicised in the popular media.
Finally, this research investigated whether or not the self-assessed respondents' knowledge is
a factor influencing people's risk ratings in the online survey and thereby a factor in the way
those risks are perceived. A correlation analysis was used to determine the degree of
association between the pmiicipants' risk ratings and their perceived and self-rated
information security knowledge.
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Introduction

Risk assessment is a subset process of risk management and is extremely valuable to identify,
analyse and evaluate risks. However, because of the general tendency for people to rely on
such analysis and accept it as objective that it can be misleading. Furthermore, extensive
psychological research has proved that risk analysis and assessment is very subjective,
leading to the emergence and conceptualisation of biases, heuristics and risk judgments as
important factors in risk analysis related disciplines.
Risk perception acknowledges that people judge risks subjectively based on their
characteristics and severity, leading them to overestimate certain risks, and underestimate
others. The inability of human perception to judge the reality of those risks has lead to the
development of two major families of theory; the psychometric paradigm, concemed with
heuristics, biases, cognitive and affective theories and the cultural themy that focuses on
cultural rather than individual psychology. Both theories aim to explain why people assess the
severity of risks differently. Therefore, to understand and consider the subjectivity and the
existence of risk perceptions, as explained through those theories, should be highly beneficial
to a risk analysis process.
By measuring the statistical gaps between the answers obtained from a participating sample to
an online survey and professional surveys as sources of data, the research highlighted the
existence of perception gaps in various risk areas. Risk perception theories reviewed and
discussed in this research acknowledge that people judge risks subjectively. However, only
broad risks are discussed by the literature. This research reconciled those theories and
specialised risks by specifically focussing on information security risks.
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1.1. Background to the study
According to the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA, 2006a) the
risk analysis process involves:
• Examination ofthe risk sources;
• Their positive and negative consequences;
• The likelihood that those consequences may occur;
• The factors affecting those consequences;
•

Assessment of the existing controls or processes that tend to minimize risks

While past experiences, market research, expert advice and security engineering models can
provide a closer estimate of risk impact and its likelihood, the researcher believes that it is
also crucial to assess risks at an individual and collective level (ENISA, 2006a). By
considering the risk perceptions occurring at individual and collective levels, security
professionals and risk decision makers would encompass further the scope of the risks and in
turn, feed specific advice back to the risk analysis process for a stronger and more specific
analysis. It is a reasonable assumption that individuals' perceptions might differ from reality
itself.
This problem has been measured by numerous researchers and has been used extensively in
psychology, social sciences, business (Burke & Greenglass, 2004; Osman, Gutierrez, BmTios,
Kopper, & Chiros, 1998; Tversky, 1974), (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004); other
attempts were directed at security in broader terms (Schneier, 2007) but a general lack of
information security related research prevailed. Understanding how those perceptions are
triggereds and affect people's views is a very important aspect to any risk analysis.
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1.2. Significance of the study
Organisations and users are exposed continuously to an endless number of new or changing
threats and vulnerabilities that may affect their operation or the fulfilment of their objectives
(ENISA, 2006b ). As previously discussed, the management of such concerns is handled
through the risk assessment process. Alberts and Dorofee (2001) describe risk assessment as a
several step and complex multi-step process necessary to an effective risk management
process.
Identification, analysis and evaluation of the threats and vulnerabilities posed to assets are the
only way to understand and measure the impact of the risk involved and hence, to decide
upon the appropriate measures and controls to manage them (ENISA, 2006a). Furthermore,
risk assessment can be estimated using statistical analysis and formulas combining impacts
and likelihood (Whitman & Herbert, 2005).
Risk analysis is a subjective process varying in detail according to the risk, purpose of the
analysis, required protection levels and scope of the assets (ENISA, 2006a). The analysis can
be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative; however, a consistent approach with criteria
defined by the risk management strategy must be followed. To fulfil this numerous
frameworks and methodologies have been developed to formalise the approach to risk
assessment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; AS/NZS:4360:2004, 2004; Octave, 2003) and all
emphasise the importance of a broad knowledge of the organization's business and security
processes.
However, Ames (2007) argues that the widespread applic'ation of mathematics makes
quantitative risk assessment measurements appear more precise and mature than in fact they
are, as they are often impractical and not cost-effective. In contrast, qualitative measures can
be developed to be more granular and sophisticated; "the attitudes, perceptions, habits, history
. . . will determine what approach will work" (Ames, 2007). This directly implies the
integration of the human factor, as it is sometimes referred to in the risk assessment equation.
After all, humans are often regarded as the weakest link in the security chain (Tan, 2006) and
as poor judges of risks (Bailey, 2006). Schneier (2007), whose research outlines similar
conclusions, argued that people do not evaluate security trade-offs mathematically or by
examining the relative probabilities of different events; "instead, we have shortcuts, rules of
thumb, stereotypes and biases generally known as 'heuristics'. These heuristics affect how we
think about risks, how we evaluate the probability of future events, how we consider costs and
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how we make trade-offs". Schneier (2007) insists that considering the human factor, and more
precisely the several ways one could perceive risks is of great importance therefore in order to
understand all risks and thereby get the risks right.
Getting those risks right is important at a business level where an operational balance needs to
be found between business processes and LT. security. Considering the above can help us
achieve this and enable the decision makers to take more informed security decisions.
Similarly, security professionals can leverage the findings of the research in order to improve
the risk assessment processes thereby to manage the risks better and to decide on the
appropriate actions and levels of controls to put in place.
The intent of this research is to provide further information to help risk assessments by
highlighting the existence of risk perceptions in information security. First, by analysing the
data collected by a questio1111aire, the research estimates the importance that risk perception
may have on the representations of those risks. Then, through the analysis of those results, the
research discusses factors that may influence or explain those perceptions. The objective was
to detennine the presence and impact of variables such as biases, heuristics and experiences
that get in the way of risk assessment. It is from the results and concluding analysis of the
findings that this research narrowed down those factors.
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Case Analysis of Information Secmity Risk Perceptions

Alexis Guillot

1.3. Research questions
Is there a gap between people's perception of information security risks and the findings of
published research of those risks?
From this research question, the study answered the following sub-questions:
.. Which risks are perceived with the highest, lowest, or no gap amongst all participants?
.. Are there risk perception differences between people that self-assessed their
information security knowledge 'above average' and the overall participating sample?

12

Case Analysis of Infotmation Security Risk Perceptions

2.

Alexis Guillot

Review of the literature

2. 1. Information security surveys, source of risk measurements
Measuring risk can be done in two ways; qualitatively, as outlined by the Australian Risk
Management Standards (AS/NZS:4360:2004, 2004) using a model that rates risks as High,
Medium, Low and quantitatively, using probabilities and statistics to mathematically measure
losses, impacts and risks. The United States General Accounting Office explains that "efforts
to develop precisely quantified risks are not cost-effective"; the amount of time and effort
involved in the process are simply too great. (GAO, 1998). Qualitative measures on the other
hand can be developed as a more granular and sophisticated approach. This research adopted
a 'traffic light representation to illustrate the results of the data analysis (Section 5) in order to
visually characterize the data. This method of representation is easily understood, visual and
requires little detailed analysis (Ames, 2007).
Three criteria are noticeable when considering sources outlining risk measurements:
• People have different notions of what constitutes risk, threat and vulnerability (Ames,
2007);
• The surveys are an indicative measurement of security as it happens in a business
context (Deloitte, 2006);
•

"So far no one has come up with a common, clear, straightforward way of measuring
risk that applies or works equally well in all circumstances" (Ames, 2007).

• Whilst the definition of risk, threat and vulnerability may vary from one individual to
another, the questions used in this study resulted from risks specifically selected for
presenting similar occurrences, shown by exhibiting similar percentages and ratings
across all surveys.
Ames (2007) also argues that the science of risk became quite a separate discipline and highly
mathematical, as a result many financial and economic components have been injected into
risk components. However, the research does require a comparative basis that is:
• "Comparable" - which can be compared the scale of one risk meaningfully with
another (Ames, 2007);
• "Consistent"- various surveys presented similar measures for the same risks (Ames,
2007);
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"Quantifiable" (Ames, 2007).

This is of a critical importance for this study. The interest directly lies in the risk
measurements undertaken by those surveys. However, some surveys attracted criticism for
unclear methodologies (Walsh, 2006); a preliminary research took special care to only retain
risks that showed similar results statistics across all surveys. Furthermore, the AusCERT
(2005; 2006) survey, as discussed in Appendix B, was adapted from the CSIIFBI Computer
Crime and Security Survey (2006; 2007) which ensured high similarities between their
methodologies, whilst providing the research with the assurance that their definition of the
risks was consistent. The research focuses on risks that presented similar occurrence rates
across both surveys as shown in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1 Risk occurrence percentages as per information security surveys
Selected risks {As per
Appendix A)
Virus attacks
Self-propagating malware
infection {virus or worm)
Non-propagating malware
infection {Trojan or
rootkit)
Denial of Service attacks
Theft or breach of
proprietary or confidential
information
System penetration by
outsider
Laptop theft
Insider abuse of Internet
access, e-mail or
computer resources
Unauthorized access to
information by insider
Website defacement

AusCERT

AusCERT

CSI/FBI

CSI/FBI

2005

2006

2006

2007

64%

66%

65%

52%

-%

45%

-%

-%

-%

21%

-%

-%

24%

18%

25%

25%

14%

14%

9%

8%

6%

7%

15%

13%

53%

58%

47%

50%

68%

62%

42%

59%

9%

8%

32%

25%

8%

8%

6%

10%
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Conventional wisdom about risk

Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (2003) refers to the human brain as having two
separate cognitive systems, one for intuition and one for reason:
The operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative,
implicit . . . and often emotionally charged; they are also governed by habit and
therefore difficult to control or modify. The operations of System 2 are slower, serial,
effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled; they are
also relatively flexible and potentially rule governed.
Bruce Schneier sees a causal relationship between those findings and the irrational trade-offs
made by people. "Most of the time, when the perception of security doesn't match the reality
of security, it's because the perception of the risk doesn't match the reality of the risk"
(Schneier, 2007). To illustrate his arguments, he explains that food poisoning kills an average
of 5000 people every year, and automobiles killed another 40,000; yet the public seem to be
more worried about the non-repeated 9/11 terrorist act which in comparison caused less than
3000 deaths (Schneier, 2007). Looking at those statistics, he comments that people are more
afraid of flying than driving their cars. Those issues lead Schneier to construct Table 2-2

Table 2-2 Conventional risk wisdom
People exaggerate risks that are:

People downplay risks that are:

Spectacular

Pedestrian

Rare

Common

Beyond their control, or externally imposed

More under their control, or taken willingly

Talked about

Not discussed

Intentional or man-made

Natural

Immediate

Long-term or diffuse

Sudden

Evolving slowly over time

Affecting them personally

Affecting others

New and unfamiliar

Familiar

Uncetiain

Well understood

Directed against their children

Directed towards themselves
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Morally offensive

Morally desirable

Entirely without redeeming features

Associated with some ancillary benefit

Not like their current situation

Like their current situation

2.3. Risk perceptions theories
Risk perception is subject to judgment that people make about the characteristics and severity
of a risk. Numerous theories emerged to explain why people make different estimates of the
dangerousness of risks, however social scientists have developed two major families of
theory, namely the psychometric paradigm and cultural theory (Slovic, 1987; Thompson,
Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990).
The psychometric paradigm has been developed "in order to explain risk evaluations in terms
of intuitive mental rules-of-thumb that people use when judging the likelihood of everyday
events" (Skjong & Wentworth, 2001). It mainly focuses on three areas, the heuristics and
biases (Kalmeman & Tversky, 1984) the cognitive theories (Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein,
& Roe, 1981) and the affective theories (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flym1, & Satterfield, 2000).

The cultural theory on the other hand is concerned with cultural biases (Douglas, 1994).
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concepts are discussed through the literature review of this research.

those research domains saw the emergence of sub-theories or concepts, represented here as being attached to the 'clouds'. Some of those
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Social perceptions and representations

In addition to the emotional, economic and various factors affecting risk perceptions, social
psychologists have been interested in the social aspects of perceptions. Research found that
experts defined and assessed risks differently compared to lay people (Slavic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein, 1980). Experts focused on a quantitative assessment such as risk likelihood and
risk impacts, while the public had a tendency to focus on qualitative arguments, namely the
involvement and controllability dimensions of those risks. Fmiher research explored the risk
perception approaches, arguing that many models focus on static and intra-personal processes.
Social representations theories applied to risk perceptions revealed that risk responses are also
a highly social, emotive and symbolic entity (Joffe, 2003) in addition to the common cultural
and psychometric paradigm theories.
Those findings are consistent with the results of recent research, which all considered the
social aspects of perceptions in addition to cultural, economical and emotive issues
(Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Baaren, 2006; Hasehuhn & Mellers, 2005; Lemer et al.,
2004) hence, the interest in both social representations and risk perceptions. Also it was felt
strongly that bridging social representation theories to risk perception would bring to it a more
sociological approach (Manis, Langford, & O'Riordan, 1998).

2.5. Affective theories
Research more recently tumed to focus on the effects of emotions and their roles and
influences on risk perceptions. Lemer, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) created a precedent in
the area of social and behavioural psychology by linking emotional impacts to economic
decisions while previous research only documented the carryover of specific emotions (anger,
fear, hate ... ) and their impact on behaviours. The findings have ramifications in various
disciplines such as finance (does emotional-carryover diminish when real money is at stake?)
or behavioural economics (until now, the decision making processes have been essentially
focussed on cognition, with little to no interest for the emotions involved in those decisions).
In relation to the research topic, the findings are useful as Lemer, et al provide this research
with a basis to suggest that emotions can have a dramatic effect on transactions even though
they arise from a prior, irrelevant situation. This is a direct implication of the emotional and
social theory.
18
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Other studies (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren & van Baaren, 2006) have used Lerner, Small and
Loewenstein's results as a starting point for further investigation, providing additional layers
of acceptation and peer-reviewing to the study. The initial findings served as a great
complementary basis to

Dijksterhuis'

"deliberation-without-attention"

effect,

which

introduces the impacts of conscious and unconscious deliberation on decisions. The latest
dictates that complex choices were viewed more favourably when decisions were made in
absence of attentive deliberation, which are partly explained by the emotional states of the
tested subjects as seen in Lerner, et al (2004).
The work of Lerner, et al. found a noticeable extension in the research lead by Haselhuhn
(Hasehuhn & Mellers, 2005) which complement their conclusions on the emotional
implications of their subjects into economical activities. Those theories also find many
con-elations to major works on risk perceptions, risk judgments and influential factors in
decision-making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Slavic, 1987; Tversky, 1974).

2. 6. Theoretical framework
Figure 2-1 established that risk perceptions are subject to a variety of factors of influence.
To complicate the situation, often more than one factor often influences a participant in a
given situation. The multiple influential factors were also found to be subjective, depending
on the audience sampled (Slavic et al., 1980). A well as highly dependent on the risk
presented to the participants, factors such as risk magnitude, impacts, economic or emotional
involvements all played important roles (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Hasehuhn & Mellers, 2005;
Lerner et al., 2004; Tversky, 1974).
This study is interested specifically in information security risks. The research aim is to
highlight the existence of perceptions directed towards those risks. The following research
framework is designed exclusively to provide a specific and dedicated focus on each of the
ten analysed risks.
The information security surveys from AusCERT 2005, 2006 and CSIIFBI 2006, 2007 were
used as sources for risk quantification. The AusCERT and CSI/FBI surveys questioned the
participants on the

natur~

and type of attacks detected over a 12 month period. The

contributors' answers, formulated into percentages, outline the occurrences of the attacks.
Those percentages provide the comparative basis for this research to establish the "riskiness"

19

Case Analysis of Infonnation Security Risk Perceptions

Alexis Guillot

of the threat driving the attacks. As previously discussed, the surveys acted as a reference as
well as a comparative baseline to highlight the gap between the pmiicipants' answers and the
results of those surveys.
The following framework was designed to answer the research question; it applied to each
one of the ten risks. Once data for all ten risks were registered, the research used the same
workflow and applied it to each respondent.
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For each survey question: collect and describe data (descriptive
statistics)

Classify data: high, medium, low, no gap

Statistical analysis: is there a gap between people's perception of
Information Security risks and the findings of published researches

Statistical analysis: identify risks perceived with the highest,
medium or lowest gaps amongst all participants

Self-rated
know ledge scores

Statistical association: are there risk perception differences
between people that self-assessed their Information Security
knowledge 'above aver~' and the overall participating sample?

F igure 2-2 High-level research framew ork: This fi gure is a high level overview of the
research and how the several elements of this research, starting with the data collection to the
conclusions, interacts and flow.
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Research methods and design

3.1. Research design
The branch of philosophy known as epistemology is dedicated to knowledge and more
precisely, to how we come to know. Methodology, on the other hand, whilst also being
concerned with knowledge is much more practical and focused on the specific ways one could
use to understand the world better. These two concepts are intimately related, one involving
the "philosophy of how to know the world while the latter involves the practice" (Trochim,
2006c). In epistemology one view, referred to as empiricism, argues that knowledge is
derived from experience; whereas rationalism considers knowledge as acquired through
reason and intuition, independently from experience. Finally, positivism, an extreme form of
empiricism, holds that nothing is inherent and things that can be measured, such as
observation and experimentation, only acquire knowledge.
In order to comply with this, this research used a positivist epistemology as the lmowledge
required to address the research question requires to be measured through experimentation. In
addition, the quasi-experimental design was selected to allow the researcher to present
arguments from the literature to infer causal relationships whilst opening the research design
to the opportunity of further data collection.

3.2. Research methodology
For this research, the quantitative data collection and analysis is based on the administration
of a survey instrument.
The use of a survey instrument as a data collection means requires a level of interaction
between the researcher and the participants. Trochim's methodology (2006d) was used to
determine the appropriate classification of this research. In accordance with his method, the
research design does not use random assignment to groups; however, it does use multiple
groups or multiple waves of measurements. Therefore, the research methodology that is best
suited to this research is the quasi-experimental design. This allows the researcher to have
samples that are not a true representation of the population. Furthermore, the lack of true
randomness from the sample selection means that causal relationships can be inferred only,
not used to prove causality.
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The data gathered from the survey is designed to:
" Capture the self-rated knowledge in information security of the participating sample;
" Record the participant's own rating of given risks' instance; &
" Capture this rating within the context of the likelihood of the occurrence of those
risks.
The analysis of the gap between the participant answers and the known results to the
questions allowed the research to correlate this data between the participants, depending on
the results, and infer causal relationships with the pmiicipant' s self-assessed levels of
knowledge in information security. The basis for the analysis of that data is outlined in
Section 3. 7.

3.3. Survey design
The quantitative nature of the data collection lead this research towards the adoption of a data
collection process performed through a survey.
Surveys are a means of collecting data for descriptive purposes. For the purpose of this
research. Closed-ended questions were used in order to provide the participants with a limited
number of possible alternatives. The participants were asked to choose one answer only, the
answer that best represented their beliefs.
This was controlled within the survey software as participants were able to select one answer
per question only. The survey technical setup is further discussed in Section 4.1.
The survey construct made use of two types of rating scales discussed in Section 3.6.
The chosen survey administration method was an anonymous web questionnaire. The
procedure for data collection and survey administrating can be found in Section 7.6, whilst the
technicalities and configuration details of the survey software used to collect the data are
available in Section 8.1.

3.4.

Sampling methodology

The methodology employed allows the sample to not be a true representation of the
population. This research uses a non-probability purposive sampling method (Trochim,
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2006b ). Such a sampling technique is used when the individual members of the population do
not have an equal likelihood of being selected to be a member of the sample (Jackson, 2006).
The validity and reliability of this sample is further discussed in Section 3.8 and 3.9.
The type of non-probability sampling selected for this research is known as quota sampling. It
involves ensuring that the sample is similar to the population in certain characteristics. Even
though this research tried to ensure similarity with the population in certain characteristics,
the population is not sampled randomly. Participants are found wherever they can be, through
whatever means is convenient (Jackson, 2006).
A selection of an informed sample fulfils the unique purpose as being computer literate is the
only characteristics in which this research is interested. This direction was chosen to ensure
similarities with the information security surveys used, although limited information was
available on their original targeted samples. This issue is further discussed in Section 3.8, 3.9
and 3.10.
The target sample received a standardised e-mail invitation to participate in the survey. The
invitation contained a link to the questionnaire as well as the content of the information letter
that outlined a brief explanation of the study, the privacy conditions surrounding the data
collection, as well as the consent request. That information is available in Appendix C.
Participants were encouraged to provide honest and accurate answers as the data collection
was anonymous. Consent was mandatory in order to begin the survey.
The targeted population for the survey component consisted of 48 individual participants
(N=48) drawn from various sources. The invitations were sent to various security groups in
the community that include security researchers, academics and professionals from public and
private sector. Representatives from the School of Computer of Information Science Security
Research Group (SCISSEC, 2007), which includes seven lecturers and a dozen research
students at both undergraduate honours and postgraduate level agreed to notify the members
of their groups and associations about the survey and encourage them to pmiicipate.
Analogous associations, namely the West Australian Information Security Special Interest
Group (WAISSIG, 2007) and the Australian Information Security Association (AISA, 2007)
were amongst the represented groups. In addition to those security professionals, survey
invitations were generated for an equal number of individuals that were known not to belong
to security groups. The intent was to create a balance of the represented population with both
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security professionals (or those related to security group or activity) and participants that were
not.
The use of a relatively informed and professional sample should ensure a high response rate.
To maximise this rate further, the participants had a two weeks period to complete the survey.
In addition, by hosting the questionnaire online, it was available 24/7, effectively allowing the
participants to answer the questions at their convenience. The validity of the sample is
discussed in Section 3. 9.

3.5. Procedure for data collection
"' The questionnaire was hosted on a secure server hosted internally by the School of
Computer of Health and Science (SCIS) which has endorsed similar data collections in
the past and has the infrastructure available to support the needs of this questionnaire;
• A secure URL linked the participants to the questionnaire in order to ensure the
security and privacy of the data collected;
"' A random number was generated for each invitation and aggregated into the secure
URL in order to directly link participants to the questionnaire; this ensured that each
participant only completed the questionnaire once;
"' The participants' answers were collected in a password protected database;
• The credentials were available to the researcher only, providing additional privacy
guarantees;
• Pmiicipants were identified only by a unique computed generated number when they
input their records via the online survey;
"' The survey was made unavailable and removed from its host after a two week period;
"' Information was collected and transferred to removable medium where it was
encrypted; &
"' All collected data will be preserved for a period of not less than five years in order to
comply with Ethics requirements as outlined by Appendix D.
Further information supporting the above section is available at the following locations:
• Appendix A: Questimmaire;
• Appendix B: Information security surveys selection criteria;
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" Appendix C: Information letter and informed consent;
" Appendix D: Ethics approval letter; &
" Section 4.1: Questionnaire setup.

3.6. Sampling measurements: rating scales
Trochim (2006a) outlines the broad steps towards the development and usage of a rating scale
with which this research as follows:
" Define the focus of the scale;
" Generate the items which define the percentage ranges used by the scale; &
" Rate the items that provide the measures required by the research.
This led to the creation of two scales: one for the measurement of the participant's knowledge
in the information security discipline and one which focused on a qualitative risk rating in
terms of a percentage range.

Ordinal scales, often referred to as ranked data, are being used for all eleven questions.
Objects are assigned to categories that carry a numerical property and form a rank order along
a continuum. The data have the properties to identify and rating the magnitude but lack equal
unit size and absolute zero (Jackson, 2006).
Question 1, representing a self-assessment of the participants' knowledge was rated against
the following nominal scale:

Table 3-1 Self-rated knowledge scale
No lmowledge

0

Low knowledge

1

Some knowledge

2

Average knowledge

3

Good knowledge

4

Expert knowledge

5
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This type of scale is known as an itemized rating scale, or specific categ01y scale (Krech &
Crutchfield, 1948) used in the quantification of judgments and social attitudes.
Those scales are used as the self-reported measure on how people report that they act, think,
or feel (Jackson, 2006), thus aiding this research in collecting data on cognitive events by
asking individuals to report how they rate their information security knowledge. Precautions
were taken to ensure the reliability and validity of the self-ratings and are discussed in Section
3.8.

Questions 2 to 11, present a series of ten risks to the participants. From the survey's point of
view the respondents were asked to rate them against the following five-point ordinal scale:

Table 3-2 Risk rating scale
Ve1y low

0-20%

(light green)

Low

21-40%

(green)

Medium

41-60%

(yellow)

High

61-80%

(orange)

Very high

81-100%

(red)

The scale scores are derived from percentage range suitable to the survey findings as shown
in Table 2-1. The reliability of those scales is discussed in Section 3 .8.

3. 7.

Data analysis

From the data analysis point of view, the ordinal scales used for all eleven questions canied
identity and magnitude for each question. Each individual item received a rank (i.e.: a
number) that canied identity and conveyed information about order of magnitude (i.e.: how
many participants rated themselves as having high, low, very low knowledge within the
sample group).
Quantitative methods applied to the analysis of the collected data (discussed in Section 3. 7).
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Two parameters in the targeted population are at the core of this research:
1.

The parameter of self-assessment rating (measured as an ordinal value, i.e.: a number)

2. The parameter of the likelihood of a risk in the opinion of the participant (measured as
an ordinal value, i.e.: percentage rank).
Taken individually, the second parameter is the one that provides this research with the basis
to partially answer the following research questions:
" Is there a gap between the overall participants' answers and the results of previous
surveys to the questions on risks?
" Which risks are perceived with the highest, lowest, or same gap amongst all
participants?
However it is the relationship between those two parameters that is the basis to the remaining
research question:
" Are there any risk perception differences between people that self-assessed their
information security knowledge as being 'above average' and the overall participating
sample?'

Descriptive statistics were used to conduct the prelimina1y analysis for Question 1 to 11 and
describe the results from the survey constmct in meaningful terms. This analysis allowed the
research to depict the data set in terms of numerical measures that describe the distribution
and central tendencies for the answers to each of the eleven questions (Section 5.1).

Inferential statistics methods were used to draw observations from the data collected and
answer the research questions.
It is critical to the analysis that the data collected from question 1 is not directly compared to
the results collected for the remaining questions. Similarly, the research did not categorise the
participants based on those data. Therefore, answers provided by question 1 were not used to
judge the level of knowledge of the participants, as opposed to a self-assessment, against their
performance on the remainder of the questions, nor did it play any role in categorizing the
participants' knowledge levels based on their answers. The intent behind the self-assessment
question is to provide an additional variable for the analysis and highlight of information
security risk perception and thereby answer the research question: 'Are there any risk
perception differences between people that self-assessed their information security knowledge
as being 'above average' and the overall participating sample?'
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Question 1 however was used as a comparative baseline to evaluate the association between
two variables using bivariate correlations. As seen in Section 2.4, social perceptions and
representations also play an important role in risk perceptions. It therefore represents a
variable of interest that this research measured. In order to do this, a calculation of the
correlation coefficient was used to determine the degree of association between two variables
of interest, thereby determining their statistical independence and measure of association.
For the purpose of this research, the scope of the analysis was limited to the following two
variables:
10

Participant's self-rated knowledge score and

10

Participant's answers to ten risk questions.

Questions 2 to 11 outlined a measure of the gap between an individual's perceptions of risks
against their ranked occurrences as shown by the information security surveys.
The data for each question was organised and described using descriptive statistics.
Inferential statistics were used to test the data for variance with the results extracted from the
information security surveys (providing a measure of the gap).
In inference testing the significance of this gap is demonstrated and interpreted for questions
2 to 11 through the comparison of the reference baseline's mean (,uO), (as shown in Table
2-1), with the calculated mean for the survey sample (,u1), (performed in Section 5.2).
The one-sample t-test was one of the methods used for inferential testing. The t-test is a
parametric inferential statistical test of the null hypothesis for a single sample where the
population variance (or gap) is not known (Jackson, 2006).
The one-sample t-test allowed the research to measure the variations between the mean (,uO)
obtained for the reference information security surveys (Table 2-1) and the mean (,u 1)
calculated for questions 2 to 11 (from the survey sample group) as seen in Section 9.2. This
effectively provided a measure of the variances between the means, thereby revealing gaps in
the perceptions of risks.
The one-sample t-test also provides this research with a measure of the two-tailed hypothesis
test (p). The significance of this p value is what further confirmed the variance or gap in risk
perceptions.
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The samples were later categorised into groups of different gap strength to show an easy and
visual comparison. Each group was associated with an ordinal metric value defined by its
variance with the reference answer from the surveys (shown in Table 2-1) as follows:
OJ

High gaps- participant answers have a variance of+/- 3 points on the five-point-scale.

OJ

Medium gaps- participant answers have a variance of+/- 2 points on the five-pointscale.

OJ

Low gaps- participant answers have a variance of+/- 1 point on the five-point-scale.

OJ

No gaps -participant answers are the same and have no variance

3.8. Reliability
"Reliability of a measure is defined as the extent to which it is free from random elTor
components" (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991).
The risk definition, as seen in Appendix A, may sound unitary or multi-dimensional to the
participants. To ensure the reliability of the risk definitions, the risk formulations used for
question 2 to 11 (Appendix A) are comparable with the risk defmition and wordiness used by
the information security surveys. Furthermore, as the data analysis phase compares each
participant's answers to the known rankings in the professional information security surveys
as seen in Table 2-1; the data analysis demands the use of identical risk wordings.
Shrauger and Osberg (1981) outline several precautions that must be taken to obtain reliable
and valid self-ratings. Following their recommendations, in this research the individuals were
explicitly told the attributes to be rated; for example in the case of question 1 "your
information security knowledge". The second recommendation is concerned with the
accuracy of the answers. It is often believed that self-raters distort their responses rather than
convey their honest assessments if those ratings are to be used to distribute valued resources
(Judd et al., 1991). The authors insist that evidence for this is limited. However, this research
enlists the participants' co-operation in the rating task by stressing that the accuracy of the
answers is highly valued and that the answers will remain completely confidential and
anonymous. This information is a part of the consent page as shown in Appendix C.
To ensure the reliability of the scale used by questions 2 to 11, Judd, et al (1991) advise the
construction of a scale with a wider range, as it may make the pa1iicipants more comfmiable
in indicating their position and help reduce biases. The halo bias, according to Cooper (1981 ),
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which is the tendency for an overall positive or negative rating of an object, can become
problematic and needs to be considered in the formulation of the survey construct. To name a
few halo biases, the generosity error leads to an overestimate of desirable qualities of an
object whilst the contrast error might lead the participants to see an object as opposite to them
on a trait (Judd et al., 1991).
Finally, the motivation of the participants to provide honest input was found by Cooper
(1981) to be beneficial in reducing those biases. This was previously discussed and addressed
by the construct of the survey.

3.9. Validity
The validity is the extent to which a tool measures what it is intended to measure (Tucker,
2007). In the context of this research the validity of the findings is highly dependent on
accurate perception measurements.
The ability to demonstrate close similarities between the survey measurements shown by
Table 2-1 represents a type of validity test. Guillot and Kennedy (2007) showed that both
AusCERT and CSVFBI used an informed sample in the public and private sector with
participants that held various targeted positions; this is also shown in Appendix B. This
research selected a similar sample (as shown in Section 3.4) that identifies the participants as
members of the security community, thereby providing the research with an informed group
of participants who are familiar with security related risks. Furthermore, the survey provides
the opportunity for the participants to answer the questions from several points of views,
thereby setting a context for the given risk The participants are able, if they choose to do so,
to make a distinction between their perceptions of the given risk in relation to those contexts
(risks as perceived to affect the participant at a personal level, at a professional level, and the
risks as perceived to affect the world in general).
It appears that these measures help to ensure a high degree of reliability and validity of the

construct and the overall research.
The AusCERT 2006 survey includes the risk occurrences from 2003 to 2006. CSI/FBI on the
other hand limits the display of its results to the current year. Furthermore, the CSI/FBI 2006
and 2007 editions contain specific percentages of occurrence for each risk in addition to a
graphical representation of all risks. However the 2005 edition of the survey was limited to
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the same graphical representation and did not contain a measure of exact percentages for each
risk. Given that the researcher could only determine an approximate value of those
percentages, the decision was made not to include the results from CSIIFBI 2005.
The ability to provide information on the risks over various years allowed the researcher to
have comparative values that could indicate the evolution and trends of the risks over time.
This is also a mitigating factor to halo bias and tendencies affecting reliability. By ensuring
that participants' perception of risks is not assessed against one specific occurrence nor a
specific year, rather over a few years and a few sources of risk measurement. This allows
more flexibility and scalability in the research and analysis of the gap between the survey's
infmmation and the pa1iicipants input.
Moreover, the specially designed five-point scale allows a degree of flexibility by having
percentage ranges that were representative of all information security surveys. The research
also has the ability to mitigate the limitations originating from the surveys in terms of
accuracy of their risk representations by having a broad range of percentages, t. Those ranges,
associated with their quantitative equivalent (very low, low, medium, high, very high) allow a
more granular and sophisticated approach to risk representation for the analysis.
The validity of the data analysis relies heavily on the definition of risks. In order to mitigate
this and allow a proper comparison of this research with the results, as per the information
security surveys, the definitions of the risks in the ten risk questions (as well as the wordiness
of the questions) must match their equivalents in the infmmation security survey. Skjong and
Wentworth (200 1) stated that the word risk is known to be ambiguous and not always as
specific as being the product of probability/likelihood and consequence/impact as typically
defined by risk assessment.
The researcher acknowledges that the risks as defined in both surveys and questions 2 to 11
are subject to the interpretation of the pmiicipant. Therefore, the validity of the results is
subject to each participant's understanding of the question.
Nonetheless, the results of those questions are analysed and compared to the results shown by
the information security surveys, (summarised in Table 2-1). Therefore, integrity and
coherence of this analysis demand the usage of the same risk statements.
In order to mitigate further potential construct validity issues arising from question
misinterpretation, a context (the participant's personal opinion) for the answers is defined
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within the each of the questions. This effectively limits the scope of the interpretation that the
participants might have of a given risk.
The context provides an additional validity layer as it helps the participants who may have
different levels of information security knowledge, rendering the survey more accessible to a
larger sample. Furthermore, by asking the participants' opinion directly the question hints for
their perception of the risk (i.e.: "in your opinion").
This research aim is to measure the gaps between the respondents' answers to the
questionnaire and the information drawn from the information security surveys. The broad
nature of this scale enabled the research to reveal those gaps whilst opening the analysis to the
presentation of a variety of factors and perception related concepts. Furthermore, the scale
allows the research to be preserved from narrow conclusions that would deserve much more
expert attention from psychology researchers. Additionally, this study focuses on a specific
aspect of risk measurement: the participants' perceptions. Therefore, the findings can be
interpreted only within the context of the sample used. Generalisations can only be relevant in
the light of further research on larger samples.
The questionnaire was purposely designed to with the self-rating knowledge question, as the
participants were likely to judge their capabilities in a more accurate fashion, if the scope of
the remaining questions were left unknown.
It is also important to mention that the research disregarded any emotional aspect at an

individual levels to enhance the validity of the analysis. The focus of the research remains the
highlight and measure of gaps in risk perceptions.
The comparison of the measured perceptions and those outlined by the surveys is the
preliminary step which could, in time and with further research, be extended to target the
emotional aspects and involvements of those same information security risks. Emotions and
risk perceptions are subjects covered by the literature (Lerner et al., 2004) as discussed in the
literature review. Whilst those ideas may be used in an analysis of the inforn1ation, this
research was restricted in order to avoid considering any, emotional aspects for individual
respondents. Any comment made in relation to emotional involvements influencing
infoimation security risk perceptions were formulated as hypothesis, or in relation to existing
researches, in the context of all participants only.
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3.10. Limitations
This research only intends to be a preliminary quasi-study to highlight the existence of risk
perceptions in information security.
Whilst the literature on the psychology of risk and risk perceptions is abundant, the
researcher's background is in computer and information security, not in psychology. As per
the research questions, scope and time constraints, the research do not cover the interpretation
of the results by other means than a statistical analysis and description of the data. The
researcher acknowledges that is a potential limitation of the study, however, the complex
nature of this analysis demands that it takes place in the context of psychology and related
fields of study. It would also require more attention than the scope and timeframe allocated to
this research allows. However this research does provide the basis to highlight the existence
of risk perception gaps and a narrower focus on the nature of the affected risks (Section 5.4).
This approach may facilitate the focus of further work on the highlighted risks and may
effectively narrow down the scope of further analysis (i.e.: require more centred questions
around the highlighted risks or begin a psychological analysis and interpretation of the
existing risk perception gaps).
Another limitation is the focus on specific sources of information for the measurement of the
risks outlined in the questionnaire. The methodologies of those surveys is often criticised and
showed some limitations (Brenner, 2006; Walsh, 2006; Winkler, 2006). On the other hand,
the surveys presented several attractive and beneficial aspects to this study such as a
comprehensive presentation of risk occurrences both locally and intemationally.
This research acknowledges that the results presented in this document are best interpreted in
their intended context: considering the results from the information security surveys.
The self-rating of information security knowledge by the participants is subjective and
therefore subject to biases from the participants themselves. Whilst preventive actions were
taken to minimise those biases and ensure that the reliability and validity of the self-ratings
(section 3.8, 3.9), it is also considered as a limitation to the research that must be
acknowledged.
A limitation specifically applying to the statistical data analysis is the lack of precise data
from the information security surveys to provide accurate inferential statistics and compare
the results of the online survey to the hypothesised baseline (CSI/FBI and AusCERT).
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A one-sample t-test is the method used to detem1ine whether the mean of the population from
which the sample was drawn is the same as the hypothesised mean. Section 5.3 present the
gaps between the means on a per question (or per risk) basis and clearly shows that the mean

calculated from the survey construct (Section 5.2) provide much more detailed information
than the ones offered by the information security surveys. For instance, the means calculated
using SPSS for Windows offer the granularity of several decimal places as opposed to the
data extracted from the information security surveys that were only in percentage form. Those
percentages were later converted into an interval scale for the purpose of the analysis (as
explained and detailed through Section 3.6 and 5.2). This research had to operate with the
assumption that the scales conversion process would not attract an important error margin and
thwarts the statistical analysis. Had the information security surveys fully disclosed the results
per respondent (as per Appendix E) this research would have been able to directly apply the
one-sample t-test method to compare the mean score from the online survey to the mean score

calculated from the information security surveys.

3.11. Research methods summary
Research design:
• Quasi-experimental;
• Quantitative survey (descriptive methods for survey construction);
• Quantitative data analysis (using descriptive and inferential statistics).
Type of survey method:
• Anonymous web questionnaire (e-mail invitations).
Sampling technique:
• Non- probability (quota sampling).
Question type:
• Self-reported or Itemized rating scale;
• Close-ended questions with rating scales (ordinal scales).
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Data collection

The survey software used to conduct this research was the open source package known as
"Unit Command climate assessment and Survey System" (UCCASS, 2004).
The UCCASS (pronounced [yoo-kas]) is a PHP based survey script that allows the creation of
online surveys. It was originally designed for organizations to administer Command Climate
Assessments (annual surveys), however, the program can be used to create any type of online
survey or questionnaire.
A full range of options and access control restrictions are available from the web-interface,
the ones with a direct impact on both ethical requirements and validity of this research are
outlined below.

4.1. Survey setup
The UCCASS (2004) version used for this research was v.1.8.1.
Noticeable configuration changes made by the researcher included:
" The survey setup was specifically limited to "e-mail only".
" The invitation codes were made of a randomly generated string of ten (10)
alphanumeric characters in order to maximise the entropy of each invitation code.
" No participants were allowed to view the overall results of the research, only a
summary of their own answers.
" The setup option of allowing participants to take the survey only once (per-invitation)
was enabled.
" It was mandatory that the participants comply with the choice of one answer only;
selecting more than one answer per question would trigger the answers not to be
recorded and display an error message.
• Furthermore, the survey software allowed the questionnaire to be hidden from the
outside world, so that it was accessible only through the e-mail invitation URL. This
option was enabled.
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0

A re-direction page [indexl.php] was created to direct the participants, to a greeting
page, thanking them for their participation at the end of the successful completion of
the questions.

0

The survey was automated to activate on March the 25th 2008 at 6.00am DST (25-032008 @ 6.00 DST) and send the e-mail invitations to all participants.

0

Similarly, the survey was configured to be rendered inactive after a two week period,
on April the 8th 2008 at 6.00am DST (08-04-2008 @ 6.00 DST).

• Only one user account was used; its credentials only known to the researcher.

4.2. Responses rates
Forty-eight (48) individual pmiicipants were sent e-mail invitations to participate in this
research representing a response rate of77.08% (n=37, s=48) 1.
The response rate was calculated using the following formula:
Total response rate= [(37/48)*100]

Table 4-1 Responses rates

1

Number of participants

48

Number of respondents

37

Number of non-respondents

11

Total responses rates

77.08%

'n' represents the number of respondents; 's' represents the total sample silze.
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Data analysis

5.1. Descriptive and inferential statistics
This section reports on the data collected through the survey construct seen in Appendix A.
The data is organised per question; each question carries its own descriptive statistical
analysis performed in Microsoft Excel 2003 and the Statistical Software Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15.0 for Microsoft Windows ("SPSS", 2008) as well as the
validation of the hypothesis through inferential statistics (using a one-sample t-test)
Section 3.6 defined the two types of ordinal scales used by the participants for question 1 the
one used for question 2 to 11. In order to use that data with SPSS a conversion from an
ordinal scale into a numerical value understood by the software was necessary. The ordinal
scale used in question 1 remains unchanged as it had already ranked the data by order of
priority through a numerical assignment:

Table 5-1 Self-rated knowledge scale
No knowledge

0

Low knowledge

1

Some knowledge

2

Average knowledge

3

Good knowledge

4

Expert knowledge

5

The rating scale used for questions 2 to 11 was designed as a percentage range (Section 3.6).
For analysis purposes this numeric scale was converted into an interval as follows:

Table 5-2 Risk rating scale
Very low

0-20%

1
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Low

21-40%

2

Medium

41-60%

3

High

61-80%

4

Very high

81-100%

5

Those values are the ones visible on the X-axis of each histogram figure.
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Question 1
Figure 5-1 depicts (in frequency histogram format) the self-rated information security
knowledge score for each participant in the sample. The mean score, a measure of the
"middleness" of the entire set of data for question 1, was 3.49 (u1-1=3.49) and Standard
Deviation, which indicates the degree to which scores are clusters or spread out in a
distribution, was 0.989 (SD=0.989) describing low dispersion. The most commonly occurring
score (the mode) was four (4).

Mean =3.49
std. Dev. =0.989
N =37
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Figure 5-l Histogram of the Self-rated knowledge score

Cumulative frequency table data for the histogram revealed that fifty nine point five percent
(59.5%) of respondents rated their knowledge as 'Good' (4) or 'Very Good' (5). Only thirteen
point five percent (13.5%) of respondents rated their knowledge as 'Poor' (2) or 'Very Poor'
(1 ). Inspection of the histogram shows that relative to the normal distribution, the distribution
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is negatively skewed (-1.325), whilst the kurtosis (3.065), a reference to how flat or peaked a
distribution is, demonstrates stronger performance scores towards the higher end of the scale
with minimal dispersion amongst the scores in this particular instance.

Table 5-3 Question 1 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

0

1

2.7

2.7

2.7

2

4

10.8

10.8

13.5

3

10

27.0

27.0

40.5

4

19

51.4

51.4

91.9

5

3

8.1

8.1

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm whether this distribution was significantly different
from the normal distribution based on the score of 2.5 2
In this instance, the t value (t=6.065) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. Therefore, the self-rated knowledge as represented by Figure 5-1 shows that the
participants rated themselves with a higher information security knowledge level than
average.
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.O) is less than .05 (p < .05). This indicates that it
is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the sample mean and average distribution
mean (2.5) is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
This difference is only representative of the trend found from the self-rated knowledge scores.
Those scores are not being compared to any other value unlike the ones for questions 2 to 11,
which were compared to the values present in the information security surveys.

2

'2.5' represents the average or 'middle' score for Question one's distribution given the
chosen scale (0-5).
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Question 2
Figure 5-2 depicts each respondent's opinion of the likelihood of virus attacks. The mean
score (,ul-2=3.46) of the entire set of data for question 2 and Standard Deviation (SD=0.9)
describe a low dispersion with a strong clustering of respondents around the mean.

Mean =3.46
Std. Dev. =0.9
N=37

!!
c
CD

'1:J

c
0
c..

Ill

....CD

"-1
0

....
CD

..c
E
::::1

z

2

3

4

5
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Figure 5-2 Histogram of the likelihood of virus attacks

Inspection of the frequency distribution shows that fifty one point three percent (51.3%) of
respondents rated the likelihood of virus attacks as 'High' (4) or 'Very High' (5). Forty-eight
point six percent (48.6%) of the respondents rated the likelihood of this risk as 'Medium' (3)
or 'Low' (2). No answers were recorded for the 'Very Low' (1) rating.
The histogram and frequency table data suggest that seventy two point nine percent (72.9%)
of respondents perceive the likelihood ofvirus attacks to be 'Medium' (3) or 'High' (4).
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Inspection of the histogram shows that relative to the normal distribution, the distribution is
negatively skewed (-0.114), whilst the kurtosis (-0.693) demonstrates some marginally
stronger performance scores towards the higher end of the scale with minimal dispersion
amongst the scores in this particular instance.

Table 5-4 Question 2 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2

6

16.2

16.2

16.2

3

12

32.4

32.4

48.6

4

15

40.5

40.5

89.2

5

4

10.8

10.8

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from the
reference distribution, seen in the information security surveys, based on the 'High' score (4).
In this instance, the t value (t=-3 .651) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (,u1-2=3.46) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (,u02=4).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=0.001) is less than .05 (p < .05), which indicates
significance. Also it so indicates that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the
sample mean and hypothesised mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the Information Security surveys for question 2 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. A gap does exist.
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Question 3
Figure 5-3 depicts the respondents' opinions of the likelihood of self-propagating malware
infection (virus or worm). The data display a negatively skewed (-0.181) and kurtosis (-0.911)
characteristic of some stronger performance scores towards the higher end of the scale with
minimal dispersion amongst the scores in this particular instance.
The mean score (ul-3=3.38) of the entire set of data for question 3 and Standard Deviation
(SD=0.924) also describe a low dispersion with a strong clustering around the mean.

Mean "3.38
Std. Dev. =0.924
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Figure 5-3 Histogram of the likelihood of self-propagating malware infection

Inspection of the frequency distribution shows that seventy point two percent (70.2%) of
respondents rated the likelihood ofmalware infection as 'Medium' (3) or 'High' (4).
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Fifty one point three percent (51.3%) of respondents rated the likelihood of malware infection
as 'High' (4) or 'Very High' (5). Forty-eight point six (48.6%) of the respondents rated the
likelihood of this risk as 'Medium' (3) or 'Low' (2). No answers were recorded for the 'Very
Low' (1) rating.
The histogram and frequency table data suggest that seventy point two percent (70.2%) of
respondents perceive the likelihood ofvirus attacks being 'Medium' (3) or 'High' (4).

Table 5-5 Question 3 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2

8

21.6

21.6

21.6

3

10

27.0

27.0

48.6

4

16

43.2

43.2

91.9

5

3

8.1

8.1

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Medium'
score (3).
In this instance the t value (t=2.492) indicates that there is ve1y little significant difference
between the means. The estimate (u1-3=3.38) is slightly higher than the hypothesized value
(u0-3=3).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=0.378) is more than .05 (p > .05). This data does
not provide a basis to conclude that the overall mean differs from the hypothetical value (u03=3). This is not the same as saying that the true mean equals the hypothetical mean value
either. Those data only indicate low significance.
Therefore, the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 3 significantly differs from the one
obtained through the online survey: The existence of a gap is minimal and, in accordance with
our rating scale, is not significant enough to highlight a gap.
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Question 4

Figure 5-4 and summary statistics describe a slightly negative skewed distribution (-0.199)
with a strong clustering of responses around the mean (ul-4=3.22). Those measures are
typical of strong performance scores. towards the higher end of the scale. The standard
deviation score (SD=0.886) indicates minimal dispersion of data around the mean.
Additionally, the median (3) and standard deviation (SD=0.886) describe a strong central
tendency around the mean.

Mean =3.22

Std. Dev. =0.886
N=37
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Figure 5-4 Histogram of the likelihood of non-self propagating malware infection
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Investigation of cumulative frequencies shows that fifty four point nine percent (54.9%) of
respondents have rated the likelihood of this risk instance as 'low' (2) or 'medium' (3), whilst
forty five point nine percent (45.9%) of them rated it 'high' (4) or 'very high' (5). No
responses for 'very low' (1) were recorded.
Despite the most frequently occurring result, the mode (4), being 'High' with forty three point
two percent (43.2%), the median (3) and the mean (3.22) provide different measure of the
central tendency for this distribution.

Table 5-6 Question 3 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2

10

27.0

27.0

27.0

3

10

27.0

27.0

54.1

4

16

43.2

43.2

97.3

5

1

2.7

2.7

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Low' score
(2).
In this instance the t value (t=8.348) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (u1-4=3.22) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (u04=2).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05), which indicates
significance. It also indicates that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the
sample mean and hypothesised mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 4 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. A gap does exist.
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Question 5
Figure 5-5 depicts each the respondent's opinion of the likelihood of Denial of Service
attacks. The mode (2) provides information on the most frequently occurring score, in this
case 'Low' (2). The frequency distribution reveals that forty five point nine percent (45.9%)
of the respondents rated the likelihood of this risk as 'Low' (2) or 'Very Low' (1). Only
twenty four point three percent (24.3%) rated it as "High' (4) or 'Very High" (5).

Mean =2.76
std. Dev. =0.955
N =37

Likelihood of Denial of Service attacks

Figure 5-5 Histogram of the likelihood of denial of service attacks

The mean (ul-5=2.76) and median (3) provide an indication of the central tendency
distribution. The median resides eight point seven percent away from the mean (8.7%). The
distribution is positively skewed (0.320) with a slightly negative kurtosis (-0.563) that
demonstrates stronger scores towards the front-end of the scale. The standard deviation
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(SD=0.955) indicates little variation around the mean's distribution. Inspection of the
frequency table reveals that seventy point two percent (70.2%) of the respondents considered
the likelihood of this risk as 'Low' (2) or 'Medium' (3).

Table 5-7 Question 5 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1

2

5.4

5.4

5.4

2

15

40.5

40.5

45.9

3

11

29.7

29.7

75.7

4

8

21.6

21.6

97.3

5

1

2.7

2.7

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Low' score
(2).
In this instance the t value (t=4.822) indicates that there is very little significant difference
between the means. The estimate (u1-5=2.76) is slightly higher than the hypothesized value
(u0-5=2), however this data does not provide a basis to conclude that the overall mean differs
from the hypothetical value (u0-5=2). This is not the same as saying that the true mean equals
the hypothetical mean value either. Those data only indicate low significance.
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05). This indicates
that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the sample mean and hypothesised
mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 5 significantly differs from the one
obtained through the online survey. The existence of a gap is minimal and, in accordance to
our rating scale, is not significant enough to highlight a gap.
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Question 6
Figure 5-6 depicts each respondent's opinion of the likelihood of theft or breach of
proprietary or confidential infonnation.
The distribution displays a central tendency. The data display a negatively skewed (-0.767)
with positive kurtosis (0.388). The mean score (ul-6=3.3) and median (4) of the entire set of
data for question 6 and Standard Deviation (SD=l.l02) describe a low dispersion with the
majority of the observations being contained within one standard deviation of the mean.

Mean =3.3

std. Dev. =1.102
N =37
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Figure 5-6 Histogram of the likelihood of theft or breach of proprietary or confidential
information

Inspection of the frequency distribution shows that eighteen point nine percent (18.9%) of
respondents rated the likelihood of theft or breach of proprietary or confidential information
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as 'Very Low' (1) or 'Low' (2) whilst seventy two point nine percent (72.9%) of the
respondents rated the likelihood ofthis risk as 'Medium' (3) or 'High' (4).

Table 5-8 Question 6 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1

4

10.8

10.8

10.8

2

3

8.1

8.1

18.9

3

11

29.7

29.7

48.6

4

16

43.2

43.2

91.9

5

3

8.1

8.1

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Very Low'
score (1).
In this instance, the t value (t=12.679) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (,u1-6=3.3) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (,u06=1).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05), which indicates
significance. It also indicates that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the
sample mean and hypothesised mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 6 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. Based on the t value a significant gap exists.
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Question 7
Figure 5-7 depicts the likelihood of System penetration by an outsider as seen by each
participant in the sample. The mean (Jll-7=2. 7) of the entire set of data for question 7 and
Standard Deviation (SD=O. 777) indicates a minimal dispersion.

Mean=2.7
std. Dev. =0.777
N =37
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Likelihood of System penetration by outsider

Figure 5-7 Histogram of the likelihood of system penetration by outsider

Inspection of the histogram and frequency table reveals a strong clustering of responses
around the mean. The mode indicates that two scores (2 and 3) have an equal distribution,
therefore they have the same frequency. This is re-enforced by the median (3) and Standard
Deviation (SD=O. 777) that describe a strong central tendency around the mean.
Eighty one percent (81%) of the respondents perceiving the likelihood associated with the risk
'System penetration by outsiders' as 'Low' (2) or 'Medium' (3). Fifty six point seven percent
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(56.7%) of the respondents rated this risk as 'Medium' (3) or 'High' (4) with no responses
were recorded for 'Very High' (5).
Inspection of the histogram shows a positively skewed (-0.114) distribution whilst the
kurtosis (-0.639) demonstrates strong performance scores towards the higher end of the scale.

Table 5-9 Question 7 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1

1

2.7

2.7

2.7

2

15

40.5

40.5

43.2

3

15

40.5

40.5

83.8

4

6

16.2

16.2

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Very Low'
score (1).
In this instance, the t value (t=13.331) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (p 1-7=2. 7) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (p07=1).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05), which indicates
significance. It also indicates that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the
sample mean and hypothesised mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question, 7 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. Based on the t value, a significant gap exists.
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Question 8
Figure 5-8 depicts the respondent's opinion of the likelihood of Laptop theft. The data display
a negatively skewed (-0.504) and kurtosis (-0.661) characteristic of stronger performance
scores towards the higher end of the scale.
The mean score (u1-8=3.73) of the entire set of data for question 8 and Standard Deviation
(SD=0.99) also describe a low dispersion.

Mean =3.73
std. Dev. =0.99
N=37

Likelihood of Laptop theft

Figure 5-8 Histogram of the likelihood of laptop theft

Inspection of the frequency distribution shows that the mode (4) occurs with a frequency (17)
that is more than double the ones obtained by other scores.
Sixty seven point five percent (67.5%) of the respondents rated the likelihood of this risk as
'High' (4) or 'Ve1y High' (5).
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No scores were recorded for 'Very Low' (1). In addition, thirty two point four percent
(32.4%) of the respondents perceived the likelihood of this risk as 'Low' (2) or 'Medium' (3).

Table 5-10 Question 8 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2

6

16.2

16.2

16.2

3

6

16.2

16.2

32.4

4

17

45.9

45.9

78.4

5

8

21.6

21.6

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Medium'
score (3).
In this instance, the t value (t=4.483) indicates that there is very little significant difference
between the means. The estimate (u1-3=3.73) is slightly higher than the hypothesized value
(u0-3=3).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05). This data does
not provide a basis to conclude that the overall mean differs from the hypothetical value (u03=3). This is not the same as saying that the true mean equals the hypothetical mean value
either. Those data only indicate low significance.
The one-sample t-test output therefore enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 8 significantly differs from the one
obtained through the online survey. The existence of a gap is minimal and in accordance to
our rating scale, is not significant enough to highlight a gap.
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Question 9
Figure 5-9 depicts the respondent's opinion of the likelihood of Insider abuse of Internet
access, e-mail or computer resources.
The data set display a negatively skew (-0.761) and kurtosis (-0.669) that depicts a relatively
asymmetric distribution with heavy distribution towards the highest scores. Similarly, the
median (5) and Standard Deviation (SD=0.895) are consistent with the previous observation.

Mean =4.24
std. Dev. =0.895

N =37
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5

Likelihood of Insider abuse of Internet access, e-mail or
computer resources

Figure 5-9 Histogram of the likelihood of insider abuse of Internet access, e-mail or
computer resources

Inspection of the frequency distribution shows that the mode (5), associated with fifty one
point four percent (51.4%) of all responses, occurs with a frequency (19) that is more than
double the ones obtained by other scores. In other words, 51.4% of all respondents perceive
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the likelihood of the risk 'Insider abuse of Internet access, e-mail or computer resources' as
'Very High'.
A cumulative seventy five point eight percent (75.8%) perceived the likelihood of the same
risk as 'High' (4) or 'Very High' (5). Comparatively, twenty four point three percent (24.3%)
of the respondents recorded the likelihood of this risk as 'Low' (2) or 'Medium' (3).
No answers were recorded for 'Very Low' (1).

Table 5-11 Question 9 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

2

1

2.7

2.7

2.7

3

8

21.6

21.6

24.3

4

9

24.3

24.3

48.6

5

19

51.4

51.4

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Medium'
score (3).
In this instance, the t value (t=8.453) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (u1-9=4.24) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (u09=3).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05), which indicates
significance. It also indicates that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the
sample mean and hypothesised mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 9 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. A gap does exist.
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Question 10
Figure 5-10 depicts likelihood of the risk 'Unauthorized access to information by insider' as
rated by each participant in the sample.
The mean score (,u 1-1 0=3 .49) for the entire set of data for question 10 and Standard Deviation
(SD=0.901) describes a low dispersion.
The distribution displays a strong central tendency with a negative skew (-0.679) and a
positive kurtosis (0.481) demonstrating a minimal dispersion with better than average scores
which are more frequent towards the higher end of the rating scale. This is seen also with the
mode (4) and median (4) scores.

Mean =3.49
Std. Dev. =0.901
N =37
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Figure 5-10 Histogram of the likelihood of unauthorised access to information by insider

Cumulative frequency table data for the histogram revealed that fifty six point seven percent
(56.7%) of respondents rated the likelihood ofthis risk as 'High' (4) or 'Very High' (5). Forty

58

Case Analysis of Information Security Risk Perceptions

Alexis Guillot

three point two percent (43.2%) of the respondents rated the likelihood of this risk as 'Very
Low' (1), 'Low' (2) or 'Medium' (3).

Table 5-12 Question 10 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1

1

2.7

2.7

2.7

2

4

10.8

10.8

13.5

3

11

29.7

29.7

43.2

4

18

48.6

48.6

91.9

5

3

8.1

8.1

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Very Low'
score (1).
In this instance, the t value (t=16.781) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (ji 1-1 0=3 .49) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (p010=1).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OOO) is less than .05 (p < .05), indicating that it
is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the sample mean and hypothesised mean is
due to a coincidence alising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 10 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. Based on the t value a significant gap exists.

59

Case Analysis of Information Security Risk Perceptions

Alexis Guillot

Question 11
Figure 5-11 depicts each respondent's opinion of the likelihood of Website defacement.
The data display a moderately positive skew (0.265) and negative kurtosis (-0.505), indicating
stronger scores towards the front-end of the scale, with a strong clustering of responses
around the mean (u1).
The mean score (u 1-11 =2.46) of the entire set of data for question 11 and Standard Deviation
(SD=0.869) describe a low dispersion.

Mean =2.46
std. Dev. =0.869
N =37
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::J
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Likelihood ofWebsite defacement

Figure 5-11 Histogram of the likelihood of website defacement

Inspection of cumulative frequencies shows that forty three point two percent (43.2%) of the
respondents rated the likelihood of Website defacement as 'Medium' (3) or 'High' (4) whilst
no answers were recorded for 'Very High' (5).
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Seventy five point six percent (75.6%) rated the likelihood of this risk as 'Low' (2) or
'Medium' (3). Fifty six point eight percent (56.8%) of the respondents perceived the
likelihood of this risk as 'Very Low' (1) or 'Low' (2).
The score occurring with the most frequency or mode is 'Low' (2) with seventeen (17)
occurrences representing forty five point nine percent (45.9%) of all responses.

Table 5-13 Question 11 Cumulative Percentages

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1

4

10.8

10.8

10.8

2

17

45.9

45.9

56.8

3

11

29.7

29.7

86.5

4

5

13.5

13.5

100.0

Total

37

100.0

100.0

A one-sample t-test was used to confirm that the distribution was significantly different from
the reference distribution, as per the information security surveys based on the 'Very Low'
score (1).
In this instance, the t value (t=10.215) indicates that there is a significant difference between
the means. The estimate (u 1-11 =2.46) is quite a bit smaller than the hypothesized value (u010=1).
The value of the two-tailed significance (p=O.OO 1) is less than .05 (p < .05), which indicates
significance. It also indicates that it is unlikely that the discrepancy observed between the
sample mean and hypothesised mean is due to a coincidence arising from random sampling.
Therefore the one-sample t-test output enables the rejection of the hypothesis that the mean
score from the information security surveys for question 11 is equal to the one obtained
through the online survey. Based on the t value a significant gap exists.

61

Case Analysis of Infom1ation Security Risk Perceptions

5.2.

Alexis Guillot

Hypothesised mean scores

Providing the results of the one-sample t-test, this research was able to highlight variances or
gaps between the mean of the population from which the sample was drawn and the
hypothesised mean as per the information security surveys. The following section uses a
traffic light representation to visually highlight the gaps between the means.

Hypothesised means from the information security surveys
The hypothesised mean (uO) originating from the information security surveys was easily
calculated for each of the ten risk occunences using the sum of individual percentage scores
and divided by the total number of scores in the distribution (N=4), providing the following
data.

Table 5-14 Risk occurrence percentages as per information security surveys
AusCERT
2005

AusCERT
2006

CSI/FBI
2006

CSIIFBI
2007

Mean
(pO)
score

64%

66%

65%

52%

61.75%

-%

45%

-%

-%

45%

-%

21%

-%

-%

21%

24%

18%

25%

25%

23%

14%

14%

9%

8%

11.25%

6%

7%

15%

13%

10.25%

Q8 - Laptop theft

53%

58%

47%

50%

52%

Q9 - Insider abuse of
Internet access, e-mail
or computer
resources

68%

62%

42%

59%

57.75%

Selected risks (As per
Appendix A)
Q2 - Virus attacks
Q3- Self-propagating
malware infection
(virus or worm)
Q4 - Non-propagating
malware infection
(Trojan or rootkit)
Q5 - Denial of Service
attacks
Q6 - Theft or breach of
proprietary or
confidential
information
Q7- System
penetration by
outsider
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9%

8%

32%

25%

18.5%

8%

8%

6%

10%

8%

Those mean scores, shown in Table 5-15 were named in accordance with the following
convention:
• The mean score for the information security surveys is flO
• The mean score for question X as rated by the information security surveys is J10-X

Table 5-15 Mean scores naming conventions for the information security surveys
Information security survey risks
equivalent to:

Mean naming convention 3

Question 2

jl0-2

Question 3

jl0-3

Question 4

jl0-4

Question 5

jl0-5

Question 6

jl0-6

Question 7

jl0-7

Question 8

jl0-8

Question 9

jl0-9

Question 10

jl0-10

Question 11

jl0-11

The conversion scale previously discussed in Section 3.6 were leveraged to facilitate the
conversion of the mean percentage values obtained from the information security surveys into
a numerical interval as follows:

3

Question 1 for this research survey does not exist in the information security surveys
therefore only Question 2-11 are being used in this section.
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Table 5-16 Risk rating scale
Very low

0-20%

(light green)

Low

21-40%

(green)

Medium

41-60%

(yellow)

High

61-80%

(orange)

Very high

81-100%

(red)

Table 5-17 outlines the equivalent mean score for each risk question (Q2-11) in accordance
with that scale.

Table 5-17 Hypothesised mean scores from the information security surveys
Information security
survey risks
e uivalent to:

Very Low
(0-20%)

Low
(21-40%)

Medium
(41 -

Question 2

High
(61 80%

Very
High (81 100%

.u0-2=4
p0-3=3

Question 3
Question 4
Question 5
Question 6

.u0-6=1

Question 7

p0-7=1

Question 8

p0-8=3

Question 9

p0-9=3

Question 10

p0-10=1
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p0-11=1

Hypothesised means from the online survey
Following the same process as the previous section, the mean (,u1) drawn from the online
survey construct was individually named in accordance with the following convention as
shown in Table 5-18
• The mean score for the online survey construct is 111
• The mean score for question X as rated by the population in the online survey is 111-X

Table 5-18 Mean scores naming conventions for targeted sample population
Question number

Mean naming convention 4

Question 2

,u1-2

Question 3

f11-3

Question 4

f11-4

Question 5

111-5

Question 6

,u1-6

Question 7

,u1-7

Question 8

,u 1-8

Question 9

111-9

Question 10

,u1-10

Question 11

111 -11

4

The mean value for Question 1 (!-11-1) is not relevant for the comparison of the 'gap',
therefore not represented in this section.
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(Q2- ll).

Table 5-19 outlines the mean scores for each risk question (Q2-11 ).

Table 5-19 Mean scores drawn from the online survey 5
Survey questions
(As per Appendix A)

Very Low
(0-20%)

Low
(21-40%)

Medium
(41 -60%)

Question 2

,ul-2=3.4

Question 3

,ul-3=3.3

Question 4

,ul -4=3 .2

High
(61 80%

Question 5
Question 6

pl-6=3.3

Question 7
Question 8

,ul-8=3.7

pl-9=4.2

Question 9
Question 10

,ul-1 0= 3.4

Question 11

5

Mean values (!ll -X) have been rounded to one decimal point.
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5.3. Is there a gap in people's perception of those risks?

Research question: 'Is there a gap between people's perception of infonnation security risks
and the findings of published research of those risks?'

One of the aims of the research questions was to highlight whether or not a gap existed
between people's perception of information security risks and the findings of published
research of those risks. At this stage of the research, enough analysis elements have been
discovered to provide an answer to this question.
Based on this research methodology, measurements, information sources and statistical
analysis, the answer to this question is yes, a gap does exist between the perceptions of certain
information security risks and the published research of those risks.
(Q2-ll).

Table 5-19 indicates dispersion in the way the answers are displayed. Table 5-20 shows one
set of data superimposed on the other to provide an easy and visual location of the overlaps.
It also becomes clear that question 3, 5 and 8 do not present a gap significant enough, in

accordance to the rating scales used by this research, to prompt a change of category.
The mean scores recorded for the remaining questions (2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11) were, on the
other hand, significantly different to present a gap between the respondents' answers and the
reference mean scores obtained from the information security surveys.
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Table 5-20 Superimposed mean scores (table)
Risks
(As per Appendix A)

Very Low
(0-20%)

Q2- Virus attacks

Low
(21-40%)

Medium
(41-60%)

High
(6180%)

Very
High (81100%)

,u1-2=3.4

Q3- Self-propagating
malware infection
(vi rus or worm)

,u0-3=3
,u1-3=3.4

Q4 - Non-propagating
malware infection
(Trojan or rootkit)

,u 1-4=3 .2

QS - Denial of Service
attacks
Q6 - Theft or breach
of proprietary or
confidential
information

p0-6=1

Q7- System
penetraion by
outsider

p0-7=1

,ul-6=3.3

,u0-8=3

Q8 - Laptop theft

,u 1-8=3. 7
Q9 - Ins ider abuse of
Internet access, email or computer
resources

,u0-9=3

Q1 0 - Unauthorized
access to information
by insider

p0-10=1

Q11 - Website
defacement

p0-11=1

pl-9=4.2

,ul-1 0=3.4
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5.4. Measure of the gap
In accordance with the rating scales (Section 3.6), the samples were categorised into groups of
different gap strength. Each group were associated with an ordinal metric value defined by its
variance with the reference answer from the surveys '110' (as per Table 5-17).

As a reminder the proposed scale was defined as follows:
• High gaps- participant answers have a variance of+/- 3 points on the five-point-scale.
• Medium gaps- participant answers have a variance of+/- 2 points on the five-pointscale.
• Low gaps -participant answers have a variance of+/- 1 point on the five-point-scale.
• No gaps- participant answers are the same and have no variance
Using the above scale, it is quiet evident that questions 3, 5 and 8 display no differences with
the reference mean scores. Therefore, the focus turns to the remaining questions.
By categorising the gaps in accordance to the above scale, this research effectively answer
one of the sub-research question concerned with the classification of the gaps in perception
vanances.

Research Question: 'Which risks are perceived with the highest, lowest, or same gap
amongst all participants?'

As per the above scale and Table 5-20, the data depicts the existence of gaps of various
strengths between the mean scores as recorded by the sample of pmiicipants to this research
and the mean scores obtained from the baseline source of information (the information
security surveys). Those observations are summarised in Table 5-21.
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Table 5-21 Gaps strengths and directions
Question number
Q2 - Virus attacks
Q3 - Self-propagating
malware infection (virus or
worm)
Q4 - Non-propagating
malware infection (Trojan or
rootkit)

I~~«- Denial of Service

acks
Q6 -Theft or breach of
proprietary or confidential
information
Q7 - System penetration by
outsider
QB - laptop theft

Q9 - Insider abuse of Internet
access, e-mail or computer
resources
Q1 0 - Unauthorized access
to information by insider
Q11 - Website defacement

Recorded gap strength
Low
No gap

Low

Direction of the g..:£J
f-10-2 > f-ll-2
f-10-3

=

f-ll-3

f-10-4 < f-11-4

No gap

f-10-5

Medium

f-10-6 < f-11-6

Low

f-10- 7 < f-ll-7

No gap

,u0-8

=

=

f-ll-5

f-11-8

Low

f-10-9 < ,u 1-9

Medium

f-10-10 <f-Il-l 0

Low

f-10-11 < ,ul-11

In accordance with Table 5-20 and Table 5-21, the presence of 'medium' and 'low' and 'no'
gaps were highlighted, whilst the characteristics of a 'high' gap could not be found.
The risks that are perceived with the 'highest' gap (a gap rated as medium [+/- 2 points] in
accordance to our rating scales) are the ones from question 6 and 10, respectively the
likelihood of the risks are:
• Theft or breach of proprietary or confidential information; &
• Unauthorized access to information by insider.
The risks that are perceived with a gap of 'low' (rated [+/- 1 points] in accordance to our
rating scales) are the ones from Question, 2, 4, 7, 9 and 11 respectively the likelihood of the
risks:
• Virus attacks;
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" Non-propagating malware infection (Trojan or rootkit);
" System penetration by outsider;
" Insider abuse of Internet access, e-mail or computer resources; &
" Website defacement.
The risks that are perceived as no different (no gap in accordance to our rating scales) are
those from question 3, 5 and 8, respectively the likelihood of the risks:
" Self-propagating malware infection (virus or worm);
• Denial of Service attacks; &
" Laptop theft.
In addition, the research results can provide the direction of the gaps as shown in Table 5-21.
Question 2, 'virus attacks', was the only risk that was rated by the respondents with a lower
score than the one obtained by the information security surveys (u0-2 > ,ul-2). All other risks
were rated as having a higher likelihood than the one recorded by the surveys.
In accordance with the literature review (Section 2) those results demonstrate an underestimation of the 'likelihood of virus attacks' whilst a general over-exaggeration of the
likelihood of the other risks seem to be predominant. The only exceptions to these
observations are question 3, 5 and 8 where the likelihood of those risks did not significantly
differ from the baseline set by the surveys.
In other words, the likelihood of 'Virus attacks' (question 2) was perceived by the
participating sample as lightly to moderately lower (under-estimation) than it was in the
surveys. On the other hand, the likelihood of the risks of 'Non-propagating malware infection
(Trojan or rootkit)', 'Theft or breach of proprietary or confidential infonnation', 'System
penetration by outsider', 'Insider abuse of Internet access, e-mail or computer resources',
'Unauthorised access to information by insider' and 'Website defacement' were all perceived
by the participating sample as lightly to mildly higher (over-exaggeration) than it was in the
surveys.

72

Case Analysis of Information Security Risk Perceptions

Alexis Guillot

5.5. Association between seff..rated knowledge and risk rating
scores
Question 1 was concerned with the self-rating of the participant's information security
knowledge. As seen in Section 3.6, those self-rating scores were captured using a wide sixpoint scale varying from 'No knowledge' (0) to 'Expert' (5).
On the other hand, questions 2 to 11 were used to highlight a measure of the gap between an
individual's perceptions of risks against their ranked occurrences as shown by the information
security surveys.
Social perceptions and representations have been speculated to play an important role in risk
perceptions. Section 2 of this research reviewed some of the literature and broad concepts
surrounding social influences and self-representations. To factor those elements of research
into the data analysis the following hypothesis was formulated based on the assumptions
reviewed in the literature review.

Ho: 'The association exists between self-assessed information security knowledge ratings and

perceptions of risks.'

This section does not intend to analyse every trend and correlation occurring between evety
variable other than the ones specified above. In order to do this the bivariate output analysis
was strictly limited to the analysis of those two variables.

Bivariate correlations
Bivariate is a statistical method used to measure the degree of correlation between two

variables, thereby, determining their statistical independence and measure of association.
For the purpose of this research the following scope of the analysis was limited to the
following two variables:
• Participant's self-rated knowledge score and
• Participant's answers to ten risk questions.
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As the above two variables are categorical to each question associated to each risk, Jackson
(2006) recommends the use of the Spearman's rho (rho) as the appropriate correlation
method for those variables.
The correlation coefficient, which ranges from '-1' to '+ 1', is both a measure of the strength
and the direction of the relationship. Furthermore, for the purpose of this research, a onetailed test was used to determine the statistical significance of this correlation coefficient.
The expected direction of the association is an inferred strong positive relationship between
expert knowledge and risk perception. The one-tailed tests is used to confirm or reject null
hypothesis (Ho) and determine whether or not the correlation is statistically, significantly
different from zero. If there is no significance, the value of the one-tailed test would not
provide any conclusive information as it can be interpreted only in the context of the criterion
demonstrating significance.
Caution must be observed with the analysis of the correlation coefficient, as correlation is not
causation. By looking at the correlation between subjects that self-rated their infom1ation
security knowledge (Q 1) and the risk ratings (Q2-ll ), the data could show a positive, negative
or no correlation; yet the researcher would be reluctant to claim that those subjects always
perceive risks this way. Perception of a risk can be changed, the context may change, many
variables can fluctuate with the data and therefore correlation cmmot be causation.

Analysis of the association
Table 5-22 demonstrates the bivariate correlation between self-rated knowledge for the thirtyseven (N=37) respondents and their answers to the ten (10) risk questions.
Based on test results obtained using Spearman's rho (rho), at the required confidence level
(p=0.05), the null hypothesis, namely that no association exists between self-assessed
information security knowledge and perceptions of risk, could not be excluded.
A slightly positive relationship exists between question 1 and question 9, 10 and 11, however
not statistically significant enough to have an impact on the correlation of those variables.
Similarly, a slightly negative relationship exists between question 1 and questions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7 and 8, however, not statistically significant enough to have an impact on the correlation of
those variables.

74

Q1
.305

37

N

-.087

Sig. (1-tailed)

37

1.000

Q2

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

rho

Spearman's

Coefficient

Correlation

Q1

37

.476

-.010

Q3

Table 5-22 Results from one-tailed testing with Spearman's Rho
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37

.084

-.232

Q4

37

.250

-.114

Q5

37

.143

-.180

Q6

37

.247

-.116

Q7

37

.217

-.133

Q8

37

.321

.079

Q9

37

.158

.169

Q10

37

.498

.000

Q11
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The one-tailed test does not demonstrate any relevant information in this instance as it can
only be interpreted if the effect meets the criterion for significance, which in this case it did
not for the variables used.
Based on the rejection of the null hypothesis the data describes a situation in this study where
no statistical proof could be established for a change in one variable (i.e.: self-rated
knowledge) being associated with any particular change in another variable (i.e. risk rating).

Research Question: 'Are there risk perception differences between people that self-assessed
their information security knowledge above or below average and the overall participating
sample?'

In the absence of any argument to demonstrate a correlation between the two assessed
variables, no association between them can be inferred, in the context of this research. The
data do not establish a conclusive argument to demonstrate that people who self-assessed as
'above average' (or below average) rated those risks differently to other subjects in the
sample.
In other words, knowing the value of the self-assessed knowledge of a subject does not
provide this research with information about the way this subject rated the ten risk questions.
The sample population used in this research mostly self-rated their knowledge at a similar
level (ul-1=3.49; SD=0.989). Such reduced variability in the participant's answers could
explain the observed outcome.
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Conclusions

6. 1. Discussion
The fundamental research question was: 'is there a gap between people's perception of
information security risks and the survey results?'
The analysis of the results described in Section 5 indicates the existence of such a gap. This
gap varied for different risks.
The risks that were perceived with the 'highest' gap were associated to the likely occurrence
of the 'theft or breach of proprietaty or confidential information' and 'unauthorized access to
information by insiders'. The risks that were perceived with the 'lowest' gap were associated
with the likelihood occurrence of 'virus attacks', 'non-propagating malware infection (Trojan
or rootkit)', 'system penetration by outsiders', 'insider abuse of Internet access, e-mail or
computer resources' and 'website defacement'. Only one ofthose risks ('viruses attacks') was
perceived as occurring less frequently than the actual risk (according to the information
security surveys). All other risks seemed to be over-exaggerated in the perception of the
participants.
The risks that were perceived as no different were associated to the likely occurrence of 'selfpropagating malware infection (virus or worm)', 'denial of Service attacks' and 'laptop theft'.
The risk perception theories previously reviewed state that people are subject to certain
mental shortcuts that affect their perception of this risk when confronted with it. That
perception influences the decision making process with regard to those risks.
The existence of those mental shortcuts (biases and heuristics) influenced the researcher's
hypothesis to expect similar results to the ones presented in Table 2-2. The results supported
the risk perception theories. An informal correlation between the highlighted gaps and the
conventional wisdom about risks outlined by Table 2-2 implies that the risks concerned by
perception differences are vety much aligned with the risk perception theories described in
the literature review of this research. People have a tendency to exaggerate risks that are:
• rare;
• talked about;
• intentional or man-made;
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affecting them personally;

• new and unfamiliar; &
• morally offensive.
Most of those attributes can be associated with the over-exaggeration of the risks which had
identified gaps.
The risks with the highest perception gaps regularly seem to be the subject of recent news
reports, for example: privacy breaches, use and misuse of personal data with social
networking sites, loss of confidential and credit card information by large organisations).
Psychological literature explains that the 'availability heuristic' is at play when people assess
the likely occurrence of risks. This concept infers that data that is easily available (from
memmy, as recently seen in the media, etc.) are given more weight than other data. This
reflects a description of most risks affected by perception gaps.
This research would require further data collection from the participating sample, the
development of a new questionnaire using the same ten risks but tailored to capture
infonnation relevant to the availability theory (i.e.: 'Have you experienced a Denial of
Service attack over the past 1 month? 3 months? 6 months?'). This could provide further data
to enable a correlation between the overestimation in a risk rating and the availability of these
risks. This additional research could confirm how sound those gaps are in accordance with
risk perception theories.
In the context of information security, risk assessments are valuable to identify, analyse and
evaluate risks. Security experts are a trusted resource for evaluating risk and apply their
knowledge objectively. However, there is a general tendency to accept the analysis as
outlined by those experts which could potentially lead to a false sense of security or wrongful
prioritization of risks due to human biases. In recent years, research provided evidence of the
subjective nature of risk that is inherent in human nature. If lay people exhibit biases towards
risks, why would experts be exempted from those perceptions?
To capture the disparities between people's judgments and risk perceptions, this research
asked all participants to self-assess their level of information security knowledge on a sixpoint scale. The data obtained from this question were then statistically analysed using
correlation methods against the ratings of ten risk questions.
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This research found no statistically significant evidence that the subjects with a self-rated
information security knowledge of 'above average' rated risks any differently than the other
participants in the sample. However, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. It
would be wrong to infer that such correlation does not exist at all. The majority of the
respondents rated their knowledge as 'Good', which in accordance with the descriptive
statistics analysis depicts little variability in the types of answers given. This could explain the
outcome. Similarly, the insufficiency of the data or the context used in this research could
have been a limiting factor. Therefore, one outcome is that purposeful subject selection
should be used in any future research to construct a sample with greater variability in terms of
self-assessed knowledge. Such a sample may prove difficult to construct if further
investigation shows a Hawthorne type effect (Jackson, 2006) in which subjects consistently
over rate their state of knowledge about computer security.

6.2. Future research directions
The scientific rationality used in risk analysis is expressed through a rational enquiry and
procedure set which leverages mathematical values and metrics to typically evaluate risks as
well as their likelihood and impact.
Such analysis significantly contributes to decision-making; it is therefore important to ensure
those values, as well as their limitations, are correct.
Risk perception theories account for those limitations by acknowledging that people judge
risks subjectively based on their characteristics and severity. This in turns leads to the
overestimation of certain risks and the underestimation of others.
The literature of risk perceptions covers many of the elements at stake into two major
families: the psychometric paradigm and cultural theory.
Both theories seek to explain why people estimate the level of danger of specific risks
differently. Thus, understanding the subjectivity and the existence of risk perceptions as
explained through those theories should be highly beneficial to a risk analysis process.
This research has just started to explore the relevant literature in psychology and risk There is
a great deal more to research and learn from the correlations of risk perception, behavioural
sciences, psychology of risk and decision making related fields of study.
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However, this research identified the existence of risk perception gaps between the
participating sample and the results from the selected information security surveys.
The next logical step would be to conduct further experiments and analysis of the identified
gaps with a deeper psychological analysis of the biases and heuristics affecting the
participants and relate it more specifically to the analysis of risks.
Another research direction would be the validation and correlation of the highlighted
perception gaps using other sources of data. This research leveraged results from the
AusCERT and CSUFBI survey data for 2005 to 2007. However, to ensure that the gaps can be
reproduced other data sources would add a validation layer to the initial results and ensure
results are scientifically sound.
A long-term goal of this research is the integration of its findings into a conceptual risk
assessment model or framework. This model could bring a closer focus to factoring risk
perceptions that occur when humans analyse risks and make decisions based on those
perceptions.
This would require the establishment of a context that takes into account both realistic and
subjective aspects of risks.
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Appendix
A. Questionnaire
1. How would you rate your Information Security knowledge on the

following scale?

D

None

D

Some

D
D

Average

D

Expert

Good

PLEASE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING BEFORE ANSWERING
QUESTIONS 2 TO 11
Based on your own understanding and/or perception of the given risks,
please rate the following:

2. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of virus attacks?

D

Very Low

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High
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3. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of self-propagating malware
infection (virus or worm)?

D

VeryLow

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

VeryHigh

4. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of non-self propagating malware
infection (Trojan or rootkit)?

D

VeryLow

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

VeryHigh

5. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of Denial of Service attacks?

D

Very Low

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High
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6. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of Theft or breach of proprietary or
confidential information?

D

Ve1yLow

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High

7. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of System penetration by outsider?

D

Very Low

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High

8. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of Laptop theft?

D

Ve1y Low

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High

9. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of Insider abuse of Internet access, email or computer resources?

D

VeryLow
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D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High
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10. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of unauthorised access to
information by insider?

D

Very Low

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High

11. In your opinion, rate the likelihood of Website defacement?

D

Very Low

D

Low

D

Medium

D

High

D

Very High
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B. Information security surveys selection criteria

Information security survey selection methods
Numerous security professionals use the statistics from these surveys for conferences, training
and awareness campaigns (Theronsolutions, 2006)
The abundance of surveys in the information security area made it necessary to reduce their
number. To overcome this issue a series of selection criteria were defined and applied to the
different surveys. The following criteria were used in selecting the surveys used in this study:
• The survey must be directed specifically at information security risk;

• Outline statistical measurements of the security items measured:
" Some surveys are advisory only and are limited to concluding arguments in regards to
previously analysed measurements.
• For the purpose of this paper, the survey must present the statistical information.
• Include a justification of the methodology and clearly state the nature of the
respondents (i.e.: IT managers);
• Have a minimum of 3 years existence and include in the presentation of the results a
comparison to the previous years in order to assess the trends over the recent years;
• Be selected from sources representative of current security professionals including,
but not limited to, vendors and industry leaders, independently mandated surveys and
governmental reports.
• The surveys must be freely available to the community.
• Note: Both international and country specific surveys were considered.

Summary and methodologies
The scope and depth of the information presented by each survey vanes, rendering a
comparison harder to make. The methodologies employed by the participants show
similarities in the procedures taken to design collect and review the questionnaires.
In order to maximise the accuracy and fairness of the methodology review the information
collection was limited to the following criteria:
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• Audience surveyed;
• Dates and timelines associated with the surveys;
• Any available information regarding the design, collection and analysis of the
information (i.e.: by whom, collection method, parties involved);
• Response-rate.
It is important to note that any information transcribed below is directly quoted from the

associated survey.

AusCERT: 2006 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey:
The Australian High Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC) the Australian Federal Police (AFP) the
Police from NSW, QLD, SA, Tasmania, VIC, WA, Nmihem Territory, and AusCERT has
collaborated to produce this survey. The survey was funded by the Australian government's
Attorney-General's Department, ACNielsen, a market research and Information Company
was engaged to assist with the preparation and conduct of the survey.
The survey was adapted from the 2006 CSI/FBI survey, providing the opportunity to compare
Australian findings with the United States in some areas (AusCERT, 2006).
• The survey was deployed May 22, 2006
• Respondent answers cover the 12 months period before January 2006.
• Business reply-paid envelopes were sent to 2024 IT managers or their equivalents
from a range of Australian public and private sector organizations. Those
organizations were invited to complete the survey on-line or return the paper
questionnaire via the reply-paid envelope. Responses were also sought from a number
of private and public sector industry groups, including the Trusted Information
Sharing Network (TISN) whose members were invited to complete the survey via the
secure web site.
• Yielding 389 respondents (17% of response rate).
• All responses were anonymous.
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• Readers were warned that the format of the survey changed to increase the survey
sample size; this should consequently be considered when assessing the respondent
percentages against previous years.
• This survey is adapted from the CSIIFBI survey (AusCERT, 2006).

CSI/FBI: Computer Crime and Security Survey
This survey is conducted by the CSI with the participation of the San Francisco Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (CSIIFBI) Computer Intrusion Squad.
Its aim is to raise the level of security awareness, as well as help determine the scope of
computer incidents in the United States (U.S.) (CSI/FBI, 2006).
• The survey was deployed early January 2006.
• Respondent answers cover the year of 2006.
• Hardcopy (fist-class mailing) and e-mail versions of the survey were distributed to
5000 information security practitioners in U.S. corporations, government agencies,
financial institutions, medical institutions, and universities.
• Yielding 616 respondents (12.3% of response rate).
• All responses were administered anonymously.
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Table B- 1 Summary of the Sponsors, Managers, Participants and Methodologies for the
selected surveys
Surveys
Country
surveyed

AusCERT 2006

CSI/FBI 2006

Australia

United States of America

Independent

Public association (CSIIFBI) I

Non-profit

Governmental (CSIIFBI)

Profile

Managed by: ACNielsen
Managed by:
Sponsored by:

Sponsors or
cooperation by

Computer Security Institute (CSIIFBI)
AFP and all police forces,
AHTCC, Attorney-

and the computer intrusion squad from
San Francisco (CSIIFBI)

General's Depmiment

Frequency

Yearly

Yearly

IT managers or equivalent
TISN members

Participants

CSO readers

A number of private and
public sector industry
groups

Sample size

2024 (3 89 responded)

15 000 (434 responded)

Response rate

17%

2.89%

Mail hard-copy
E-mail

Survey method
Web-site
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C. Information letter and informed consent
Information letter
To whom it may concern,
I would like to extend an invitation for you to participate in an on-line survey as part of
research being conducted on security risks. This research investigates the existence of
perceptions in the context of information security risks.
The highlights of those perceptions and their nature have a significant impact on the risk
assessment by introducing social, emotional and human considerations in its process as well
as improve the quantification of information security risks by targeting risks more
specifically. Security professionals can leverage those findings to make informed decisions in
regards to those risks, thereby improving the management of those risks.
The on-line survey will be available for a two weeks period over a secure URL.

The

participants' answers will be anonymous and directly input in a password locked database,
only accessible to the researcher. The data will be stored on removable medium in a secure
encrypted format and will not be used for any purposes other than its intended use within this
research; all collected data will be preserved for a period of not less than 5 years.
We value your opinions and appreciate your participation. Please use care when completing
this survey as all data are collected anonymously, we highly encourage you to provide
accurate answers.
If you wish to contact me to further discuss the implications of my research, please contact

me by e-mail aguillot@student.ecu.edu.au.

Yours sincerely;
Alexis Guillot
B.IT Honours Student; Edith Cowan University
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Informed consent
I confirm that I have received, read and understood the information provided in the
Infom1ation Letter explaining this research study. I have been given the opportunity to ask
questions and any questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I am aware that if I have
any additional questions I can contact the researcher. I understand that participation in this
research project will involve answering eleven opinion-based questions on the subject of
information security risks. I understand that my answers are anonymous and will be kept
confidential that they will be used only for the purposes of this research project only. I am
aware that I am free to withdraw from further participation at any time, without explanation or
penalty.
By taking this survey, you agree to freely participate in this project and are over 18 years of
age.
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D. Ethics approval letter

Edith Cowan University

Memo

Faculty of Computing, Health and Science

Human Ethics Subcommittee

TO:

Tamara Harold, Admin. Officer, Higher Degrees

FROM:

Angus Stewmi, Chair, Faculty Human Ethics Subcommittee

SUBJECT:

Human Ethics Clearance Application/s

DATE: 29th January, 2008

Dear Tammie,
The following ethics application by

Alexis Guillot

Is there a gap between people's perception of
information security risks and the findings of
published researches of those risks.

is approved (category 2), subject to the following:

All collected data should be preserved for a period of not less than 5 years.

Best wishes,
Angus.
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E. Survey results: exported data
Data were retrieved using the following SQL query. Those data are shown in Table E-1
below.

SELECT r.sequence, q.Question, a.value FROM 'alexisresults' r, 'alexisquestions' q,
'alexis answer_values' a WHERE r.' sid' =29 AND r.qid = q.qid AND a. avid= raved

The first column represents a genenc number associated with each respondent. The
numbering sequence in the following table does not represent anything in particular to the
researcher and should be interpreted as follows: the first sets of answers for respondent
number one is labelled 1, the second sets of answers by respondent number two is labelled '2'
and so on for the whole 36 participants.
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Q1

Good

Average

Some

Good

Expert

Good

Expert

Good

Good

Respondent
Nb#

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

High

Low
High

Medium

High

Medium

High

Low

High

Low

High

High

Very

High

High

High

Low

Medium

High

Q3

Q2

Table E- 1 Results sorted per Question
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Medium

Low

High

Medium

Medium

High

Very

High

High

Low

Q4

Medium

Low

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Q5

Low

Medium

High

Low

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Low

Very

High

High

Very

Low

High

Medium

Low

Medium
Medium

Q7

Q6

Medium

High

High

High

High

Very

High

High

High

High

Q8

High

High

Very

High

High

Very

High

High

Very

High

Very

High

Medium

Q9

High

Low

High

Very

High

Very

High

Very

High

Medium

High

High

Q10

Low

Low

Low

Low
i

I

I
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Medium

Low

Low

Low

Low

Q11
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Good

Average

Good

Average

None

Average

Good

Some

Good

Average

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

High

High

High

Very

Medium

High

High

Medium

Low

High

High

Low

Low

High

High

Medium

Medium

Very High

High

Medium

Medium
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High

High

High

Low

High

Medium

High

Low

High

High

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

High

High

High

Very

Very

Medium

Medium

High

High

Very

Low

Very

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Low

Very

High

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Very

High

High
Very

Very

High

High

High

Very

Medium

High

Very

Medium

High

Medium

Very

High

Very

Low

Medium

High

Very

Medium

High

High

Medium

High

Low

High

Low

Very

High

Medium

High

Medium

High

High

Very

Low
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Medium

Low

Very

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Medium
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Good

Good

Good

Some

Good

Average

Good

Some

Average

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Low

Medium

Medium

Low

High

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Low

Medium

High

Medium

High

Medium

High

Medium
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Low

High

Medium

Low

Medium

Low

High

Medium

High

Low

Low

High

Very

High

Medium

High

High

Medium

Low

Medium

Medium

High

High

Medium

Low

Very

High

Low

High

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Low

High

High

High

High

Very

Low

High

Medium

High

Very

Medium

High

High

Very

High

Very

High

Very

Very

Very

High

Low

High

Very

High

Low

Low

High

Low

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

High

High

Medium

High

Low
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Medium

Low

Very

High

Low

Medium

Medium

High

Low

Low
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Good

Average

Good

Good

Average

Expert

Average

Good

Good

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

Medium

High

High

Very

Medium

High

High

Very

Medium

High

Low

High

Low

Low

Very High

High

High

High

Very High

Medium
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Low

Medium

High

Low

High

High

Medium

Medium

Low

High

High

High

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Very

Low

Low

High

Medium

High

Very

Medium

High

Medium

High

Medium

High

High

Low

High

High

Low

Low

High

Medium

Medium

Very
High

High

High

Very

Medium

High

Very

Medium

High

Very

Medium

High

High

Very

Very

High

High

High

Low

High

Medium

Low

High

Medium

High

Low

High

Medium

Medium

High

High

Medium
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High

Medium

High

Medium

Low

Medium

High

Low

Very

Low
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